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concessions. Yet, unlike compromises that arise in the legislative process, or at least in some ideal version of
it,3 the compromise involved in an exemption from a neutral law of general application involves neither an
exchange of benefits nor the prospect of mutual benefit-two hallmarks of compromise in, say, political (and
other) negotiations.4 There are several reasons to doubt the wisdom or fairness of the requested exemptions,
then.
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THE CHALLENGES OF CONSCIENCE IN A 
WORLD OF COMPROMISE 
AMY J. SEPINWALL 
The process of crafting and passing legislation might be thought 
to be the locus of compromise par excellence.1 Yet, where the law 
that results impinges upon moral or religious belief or practice, 
the issue of compromise arises anew, in both senses of the word: 
Individuals who oppose the law on moral or religious grounds 
believe that their political obedience will compromise them in a 
fundamental way. Their plea for an exemption from the objection-
able legal requirement is, then, a bid for further compromise.2 
Compromise in the first sense concerns an undercutting of the 
self, while compromise in the second sense involves a grant of 
concessions. Yet, unlike compromises that arise in the legislative 
process, or at least in some ideal version of it,3 the compromise 
involved in an exemption from a neutral law of general applica-
tion involves neither an exchange of benefits nor the prospect of 
mutual benefit-two hallmarks of compromise in, say, political 
(and other) negotiations.4 There are several reasons to doubt the 
wisdom or fairness of the requested exemptions, then. 
First, why should government confer a "private right to ignore 
[a] generally applicable law[] "?5 Further, why defer to conscience 
at all? The claims of conscience compel from a first-person per-
spective; they have no hold over anyone but their bearer. And 
there is no necessary connection between these claims and moral 
truth-one might be just as gripped by a conscience dictating 
virtue as one demanding vice. Worse still, where the exemption 
would impose burdens on third parties, accommodating his claims 
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of conscience threatens not just political obedience but oppression 
of others too. Finally, if compromise embodies the best of politics, 
as at least some theorists contend, then conscientious exemptions 
might well embody its worst-instances of favoritism that offend 
against commitments to neutrality and equality too. 
These are all concerns that would support significant restric-
tions on the exercise of conscientious objection, or perhaps its 
elimination altogether, as some theorists have proposed. 6 In this 
chapter, I seek to defend robust rights of conscientious objection, 
first by arguing in favor of a highly, though not completely, defer-
ential stance toward pleas for accommodations on conscientious 
grounds, and then by taking up in turn the challenges lodged 
against granting conscientious exemptions. 
I frame the discussion through the challenges and requests for 
accommodations that have been raised in response to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), focusing in par-
ticular on the employer mandate-the legal requirement that 
employers with 50 or more employees provide health insurance 
that meets a minimum set of standards.7 Among these standards 
are rules requiring coverage for women's healthcare, including 
all 20 FDA-approved methods of contraception. 8 The most promi-
nent challenge to the contraceptive coverage requirement-the 
so-called contraceptive mandate-is the one the US Supreme 
Court decided on the last day of its 2013 term, in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby.9 Hobby Lobby is a closely held corporation owned by a fam-
ily of evangelical Christians who object, on religious grounds, to 
the use of certain forms of contraception. The PPACA's employer 
mandate required that Hobby Lobby's insurance package provide 
coverage for these forms of contraception, but the Supreme Court 
held that this requirement substantially and unnecessarily bur-
dened the family's freedom of religion, and that of its corporation 
by extension. As a result of the decision, Hobby Lobby was permit-
ted to exclude contraceptive coverage from its employee health-
care plan. 10 
Challenges to the employer mandate involve three features that 
render them especially difficult, and so fruitful, for an inquiry into 
the place of conscientious objection within a democratic polity. First, 
these cases turn upon an atypical conception of complicity. In the 
standard case of conscientious objection, the objector seeks to avoid 
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having to participate directly in conduct he deems wrong. Paradig-
matically, pacifists seek to avoid fighting in a war. But the employer 
mandate cases involve complicity in an asserted wrong that occurs at 
a far greater remove: The employer claims that simply by subsidiz-
ing an insurance package through which his employees access medi-
cal interventions he deems wrong, he is complicit in their wrongs-
and indeed complicit enough, he thinks, for him to warrant an 
exemption. Historically, courts have denied pleas for exemptions 
where the objector's connection to the conduct he believes wrong 
is attenuated in the way that the employer's is. Thus, those opposed 
to war may not withhold the portion of their tax burden meant to 
fund the military,11 and those opposed to abortion may not withhold 
that portion of their university fees that fund campus health services 
where the health services provide abortions or abortion counsel-
ing.12 Hobby Lobby marked a shift from these cases. Recognizing com-
plicity through subsidization, as Hobby Lobby does, opens the door to 
a whole host of opt-outs, with potentially vast implications for much 
of our regulatory regime. 
The second challenging, and so illuminating, feature of the 
employer mandate cases is that the exemptions sought threaten to 
impose costs upon third parties. If employers are released, on con-
scientious grounds, from their obligation to cover certain forms of 
healthcare, their employees will have to secure subsidization for, 
or provision of, the excluded drugs or treatment elsewhere, possi-
bly at their own expense and inconvenience. Historically, however, 
cases of religious accommodation have involved claimants who 
have wanted to be left alone; they have not sought to impose their 
convictions, or the implications of their convictions, on others.13 
In this way, the employer mandate cases raise issues that courts 
have not yet had significant occasion to think through.14 As such, 
these cases invite us to work out the appropriate balance between 
the employers' interests in purity of conscience and the material 
( and perhaps also expressive) costs of being denied what is other-
wise a statutory entitlement. 
Finally, the employer mandate challenges exemplify a kind of 
conscientious objection that is especially threatening to demo-
cratic politics. The typical case for an accommodation involves a 
claimant pressing a marginal religious or moral commitment, and 
an exemption can be granted to him with little or no disruption to 
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anyone else, and so no worries about government partiality. Thus, 
when we permit Native Americans to use peyote (an otherwise 
illegal drug) in their religious ceremonies, we can congratulate 
ourselves on our benevolence and cultural sensitivity.15 When we 
honor the pacifist employee's objection to manufacturing tanks 
even though he evidenced no objection to manufacturing the 
steel used to make these tanks, we can celebrate our deference 
and humility.16 In both cases, accommodation implicates no one 
else's legitimate interests. But when the government faces a con-
flict between respecting religious freedom and women's reproduc-
tive rights, any outcome it pursues threatens an intolerable favorit-
ism. This conflict is perhaps the most vexing (and belabored) one 
in the literature on democratic disagreement. The employer chal-
lenges to contraceptive provision crystallize the conflict and allow 
us, perhaps, to see a way out. 
I aim in the first part of the chapter to defend a qualified, albeit 
quite deferential, stance on conscientious accommodation. But 
that does not mean that we should offer exemptions to all com-
ers. The second half of the chapter explores limits to the presump-
tively deferential exemption regime that the first part defends. 
In sum, the aspiration here is to find a balance-a suitable 
compromise-between claims of conscience and the foundational 
commitments of a liberal democracy. The outcomes at which I 
arrive may not find widespread favor among political liberals, but 
I believe that they maintain faith with the spirit of political liberal-
ism nonetheless. 
l. CONSCIENCE AND ACCOMMODATION 
A. Defining and Defending Conscience 
Thomas Hill defines "conscience" as "a capacity, commonly attrib-
uted to most human beings, to sense or immediately discern that 
what he or she has done, or is about to do ( or not do) is wrong, 
bad, and worthy of disapproval."17 This definition seems overly cog-
nitive, however. For one thing, conscience is more than mere judg-
ment, or the formation of a belief that something is "wrong, bad, 
and worthy of disapproval."18 Ifl have not internalized a particular 
moral prohibition-if I have no conviction in regard to it-I may 
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well know that an act I have done, or am about to do, is wrong and 
worthy of disapproval and yet feel no compunction about it. That 
is, it forms no part of my conscience. Further, if I have internalized 
the prohibition, then my conscience is likely to elicit more than 
just the belief that what I am about to do is wrong; it will also p_r~-
vide motivation to refrain from committing the wrong, and antici-
patory guilt or fear at the prospect of doing wrong. In other words, 
"conscience," as I shall understand the term, is a complex of cogni-
tive, conative, and emotional dispositions. 19 
In addition to the dispositions that conscience requires, we 
should also attend to its content. The commitments constitutive 
of one's conscience are those that are central to one's identity.20 
These can be non-moral (e.g., "never let the fire in one's soul 
die,"21 or "may what I do flow from me like a river, no forcing and 
no holding back, the way it is with children"22), moral ("I will rec-
ognize the inherent dignity of all people and treat them all with 
equal respect") or "I will not unjustifiably harm another"), or reli-
gious (e.g., "I will treat all human life from the moment of con-
ception as sacred"). Moreover, each of these can be specified in a 
multitude of ways. For example, "I will not cheat" is a specification 
of "I will play fair" (amoral commitment). 
I doubt that non-moral commitments could justify a consci-
entious exemption, for we do not take it to be the state's role to 
facilitate our efforts at self-actualization. By contrast, moral and 
religious commitments are typically other-regarding and, for good 
or ill, we privilege commitments motivated by concern for others 
over commitments motivated by concern for self.23 As such, we 
have more reason to exempt someone from a law binding on the 
rest of us where that law conflicts with a moral or religious com-
mitment than where it conflicts with a commitment aimed at self-
actualization that does not have religion or morality as its source. 24 
At any rate, since most claims for an accommodation turn on 
moral or religious commitments, I do not consider non-moral 
commitments further. 25 On the other hand, I follow those theo-
rists who argue, despite much law to the contrary, that we should 
be willing, where appropriate, to accommodate not just religious 
claims of conscience but moral ones too.26 I seek to elucidate, in 
what follows, when and why we should conclude that these claims 
should ground an accommodation. 
I 
I 
I 
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To begin, one might wonder why any conscientious commit-
ments ought to command our respect. Andrew Koppelman argues 
that conscience poorly tracks the cases where we feel exemptions 
should or should not be granted.27 Thus, some claims that we are 
inclined to think worthy of accommodation are not claims of con-
science per se. For example, those who seek an exemption from 
the ban on peyote, because peyote is used in religious ceremonies, 
do not claim that their consciences mandate peyote use so much as 
their religion does. On the other hand, conscience can be strongly 
felt in favor of claims that we would not want to grant. Thus, Kop-
pelman offers the rationale provided by a man who murdered his 
sister-in-law and her infant daughter because, as the murderer 
recounted, he received a divine command that he felt he could 
not disobey. 28 
The first half of Koppelman's puzzle seems readily resolved 
once we note that the dictates of conscience may be specified in 
a multitude of ways and the reasons we have for accommodat-
ing these dictates provide at least prima fade reason for accom-
modating their specifications. Thus, we allow Native Americans to 
use peyote because peyote use is a central part of their religious 
observance and we believe religious observance worthy of accom-
modation in the face of the federal drug laws. 
The second half of Koppelman's puzzle, however, which turns 
on the questionably moral nature of the contents of a conscience, 
is more troubling. And Koppelman is not alone in noting that 
claims of conscience need not track objective, or even commonly 
held, moral truths. Other theorists invoke Huck Finn as the para-
digmatic instance of someone whose conscience would have led 
him astray had he heeded it, because he had internalized the law 
of his day, and so felt deep inner turmoil about not turning Jim 
in.29 And Hannah Arendt's great and devastating insight in Eich-
mann in Jerusalem is precisely along these lines. She writes, "it was 
not his fanaticism but his very conscience that prompted Eich-
mann to adopt his uncompromising attitude [i.e., his unwavering 
devotion to the "final solution"] during the last year of the war."30 
Moreover, for Koppelman, it is not just that there is no reason 
to expect that the dictates of anyone's conscience will be worthy 
of deference but also that conscience itself-the capacity, rather 
than its contents-is hardly worthy of respect. Koppelman defines 
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conscience as "an imprecise word for an internal compulsion to act 
that is specified only by the possessor's internal psychology. "31 Con-
science, that is, is the capacity that turns one's convictions-
whatever their source-into authoritative commands. But so 
defined, Koppelman argues, conscience can play no compelling 
role in justifying accommodations: "Neither conscience ... nor 
volitional necessity necessarily points toward anything that other 
people have any obligation to respect .... Perhaps it is very hard 
for someone to resist the force of volitional necessity, and perhaps 
that counts as a (rebuttable!) reason not to ask them to do it. But 
in that case, the appropriate response is not respect. It is pity."32 In 
sum, the problem with conscience for Koppelman is that it "is 
entirely unmoored from any objective value"33 and it is heeded 
automatically, and not because its possessor reflectively endorses 
its commands. 
Contrary to Koppelman, I believe that the process of heeding 
one's conscience is not as reflexive as Koppelman contends, and 
more valuable than he allows. The notion that we follow our con-
science merely as a matter of compulsion fails to track both the 
phenomenology of, and our discourse around, conscience. Our 
most prominent experiences of conscience arise when we face a 
conflict between two incompatible norms-for example, secular 
law and religious conviction. There is no proceeding automatically 
in the face of this conflict. If we see both as normative-if we have 
adopted an "internal point of view" with respect to each34-the 
conflict will call us to attention. We will be forced to decide which 
norm to follow, and the process of so doing will require that we 
engage in conscious deliberation. 
With that said, some people do take their claims of conscience 
to be automatic trumps. Even here, however, we should not treat 
reliance on conscience as a matter of brute compulsion. For the 
automatic adherence to conscience would quite likely have been 
preceded by a moment when the individual in question did delib-
erately decide that conscience would prevail. This is just the way 
it is with commitments-we deliberately adopt them precisely so 
that, from the moment of their adoption, they will operate for us 
as non-starters:35 To adopt a commitment is to decide once and 
for all that it will function as a trump. Should a commitment be 
implicated at some time thereafter, we will not need to go through 
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the deliberative exercise of deciding what weight to give it, less 
still whether to heed it at all. That work was done the moment 
we adopted the commitment. It is efficient to proceed in this way, 
but it is also appropriate to do so: What it is for something to be a 
conviction is for it to preempt our considering whether it should 
dictate our conduct. Having been made a conviction, it just does 
dictate. Other commitments work the same way. For example, the 
marriage vow, along with its commitment to fidelity, is intended to 
take off the table each spouse's recurring evaluation of whether 
to stay in the relationship. While the marriage is well functioning 
at least, the question should not even arise; the vow short-circuits 
it. And convictions are just commitments of a particular kind-as 
I have already said, commitments are central to one's identity. In 
sum, Koppelman is right that there is something automatic about 
the exercise of conscience. But there is nothing unusual or embar-
rassing about the deliberative elision that conscience involves. 
Turning now to the other complaint, that conscience fails to 
track objective value. One can agree with those who express the 
worry and yet still believe that conscience itself is intrinsically valu-
able. The project ofliving one's life in accordance with a set of val-
ues one chooses ( or at least affirms) is a distinctive trait of persons. 
Living according to one's conscience gives meaning to our lives, 
making them about more than the peripeteia of everyday exis-
tence. The fact that we are meaning-creating creatures, that we can 
and do play a role in shaping our life stories, is valuable in its own 
right. Insofar as conscience, which again consists of our identity-
defining commitments, is central to the direction our lives take,36 
it too is valuable in its own right. We can grant all of this even 
while acknowledging that countervailing considerations might, at 
the end of the day, mandate that we deny the conscientious objec-
tor an accommodation. The connection of conscience to self, that 
is, confers a presumption in favor of claims of conscience. I shall 
go on to specify the circumstances where the presumption may 
be defeated. First, though, I seek to argue that conscience should 
always get a thumb on the scale. 
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B. Deferring to Conscience 
When it comes to blaming one another for participation in, or 
facilitation of, a wrong, both legal and moral practice set the nec-
essary threshold for complicity in light of the gravity of the sanc-
tions that a finding of complicity entails.37 Thus, under much 
domestic criminal law, for example, the predicates for complicity 
are quite demanding, given the gravity of a criminal conviction. 
In particular, one will be found complicit only if one shared the 
perpetrator's purpose in seeing the crime completed and one at 
least attempted to assist or encourage its commission.38 More gen-
erally, the harsher the sanction, the more strongly connected one 
must be to the wrong-causally and psychologically-in order for 
one to be held morally or legally responsible for it.39 In this way, 
third-personal judgments of complicity-those judgments we form 
about others-are both standardized and appropriately sensitive 
to commonsense ideas about individual culpability. 
But our first-personal complicity judgments-each of our assess-
ments of our own culpability in another's wrong-are nowhere 
near this regular, and this is so in light of three possible points of 
divergence. First, in a pluralistic society like ours, there is often 
widespread disagreement over what counts as a wrong. Contracep-
tive use is a paradigmatic case. 
Second, we might disagree about the empirical facts. For exam-
ple, the medical establishment rejects the Hobby Lobby owners' 
belief that the four contested forms of contraception are abortifa-
cients. This is not a dispute about whether destroying embryos is 
morally permissible; it is a dispute about whether these four con-
traceptive devices work by destroying embryos. So it is a factual, 
and not a moral, dispute. 
Finally, there is a third kind of disagreement, and it is the one 
of greatest relevance here-disagreement about the kind of con-
nection one must bear to another's wrong in order for one to be 
complicit in that wrong. As described above, standard moral and 
legal accounts proceed with relatively demanding conceptions of 
complicity. But conscientious objectors to insurance subsidization 
under the PPACA, or conscientious tax resisters, operate with a 
conception of complicity that is far more encompassing than the 
standard account. These individuals believe that mere facilitation 
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in a wrong ( or in conduct they believe wrong) is sufficient to ren-
der them morally responsible for that wrong, and this is so even 
if their contribution is made at several layers of remove from 
the wrong. Thus, in the contraceptive mandate challenges, the 
employer believes that merely by subsidizing an insurance plan 
through which its employees or their dependents have access to 
contraception, the employers become complicit in contraceptive 
use. Even if we are prepared to allow individuals to decide for 
themselves on matters of value (e.g., whether contraceptive use 
is wrong), we might question why we should defer to those with 
non-standard accounts when it comes to articulating the relevant 
standard of complicity. 
I have argued elsewhere that we should not judge the strength 
of claims of conscientious objection on the basis of the strength of 
the complicity claims underpinning them, for the pain the objec-
tor would experience in contributing to a wrong may be insensi-
tive to the extent of her anticipated contribution. 40 Being made to 
act against conscience produces a certain kind of pain-the pain 
of a loss of integrity, or a dislocation from the self.41 It is easy for 
many of us to imagine how compelled participation in a wrong 
might produce this sense of self-transgression, and yet difficult for 
us to fathom how a compelled remote and minor contribution 
might do so. But, from the perspective of one who holds a more 
expansive view of complicity, and so more readily sees herself as 
implicated in a wrong, the pain of facilitation in a wrong may be 
no less than that for the person who is made, against his will, to 
participate in the wrong. For example, the Quaker pacifist might 
view paying taxes to fund a war as no less violative of his commit-
ments than is fighting in that war. And what should matter for pur-
poses of conscientious accommodation is the objector's felt sense 
of complicity, not the sense of complicity we would have were we 
in her shoes. 
Put differently, conscience is tied up with the self, so it is ineluc-
tably subjective. Individuals may differ with respect to how readily 
their consciences are activated even where they agree on matters 
of substantive morality or religion-e.g., where all the individuals 
in question believe that contraceptive use is wrong. One will think 
that she bears responsibility only for her own contraceptive use; 
another will think she bears responsibility for any contraceptive 
230 AMY J. SEPINWALL 
use that she has facilitated, through its provision or subsidization. 
But the subjective experience of both may well be the same--:--each 
may think that she has done wrong in light of her connect10n to 
contraceptive use, and the breach of conscience may feel equally 
severe for each of them. 
There are circumstances where we think the law should, all else 
equal, protect individuals from having to contribute to condu~t 
they deem wrong and the feelings of guilt to whic_h that contr:-
bution would give rise. This is the rationale for which we permit 
conscientious objection to a military draft. But if the foregoing is 
correct, we have no reason to think that an objection to fighting in 
a war is more intrinsically compelling than is an objection to fund-
ing that war. To be sure, there may be extrinsic consideration_s _that 
would justify our more readily exempting someone from military 
service than from paying taxes to support a war. For example, it 
may be easier to find a replacement for the conscientious objec-
tor to a draft than it would be to find alternative funds to cover all 
of the tax dollars that would be withheld if we were to allow indi-
viduals to resist paying taxes for every government initiative they 
oppose. I shall have more to say about when countei:vail~ng con~id-
erations should restrict our accommodating consoentious objec-
tions. The point for now, however, is that, looking at the obj~ctions 
on their own merits, the very reasons we accommodate objectors 
to the draft obtain for objectors to more remote contributions to 
war, like taxes. In both cases, the objector believes that he would be 
complicit in war, which the objector believes wrong. In both case~, 
the objector anticipates that his complicity will viol~te some_ of his 
most fundamental commitments, and so he conceives of his pro-
spective complicity as a source of deep pain. If the experi~nce of 
contributing would be the same for draftee and taxpayer ahke, we 
have no reason-again, on the intrinsic merits of their claims-to 
yield to the first and not the second. All else equal, each has an 
equally compelling claim for accommodation. . . 
The foregoing treats both military participation and mili~ary 
funding as differing only in degree of contribution. But one might 
contend that they are different in kind: The draftee performs the 
controversial act; the taxpayer merely funds it. The same might be 
said of the doctor who objects to abortion or physician-assisted sui-
cide (PAS) and some other individual who contributes to it more 
I 
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remotely-e.g., the taxpayer who funds Medicaid abortions or the 
store clerk who rings up the PAS prescription. When it comes to 
complicity, the former are like principals to a crime and the lat-
ter are only accomplices. Surely this difference should make the 
objection of the person who would be made to perform the objec-
tionable act more compelling than the claim of the person who 
would contribute to it more remotely, the thought would go. 
I maintain, however, that it is no less tendentious to refer to the 
draftee or the physician as someone who would be made to "per-
form" the objectionable act than it is to characterize both draftee 
(or physician) and taxpayer as "contributors" or "participants." 
For medical care-in particular, the decision whether to have an 
abortion and especially whether to avail oneself of PAS-is typi-
cally a joint endeavor, involving physician and patient. Both are 
participants in the treatment decisions. The taxpayer or phar-
macy clerk contributes far less directly, to be sure. But the differ-
ence in question is just one of degree, not of kind. The point is 
even clearer in the face of the two objectors to military conduct-
the draftee and the taxpayer. The draftee does no more than 
participate in the war. Indeed, it is conceptually impossible for 
any one person to wage war; instead, war is, by definition, a col-
lective endeavor. Again, the draftee's participation is more direct 
than is the taxpayer's. But again, that fact alone does not make an 
objection to the draft more compelling than an objection to fund-
ing the military. And, indeed, if the law did not recognize that 
different kinds of participation in a war might nonetheless lead 
to reasonable feelings of complicity, it would require all pacifist 
draftees to fulfill their service in noncombatant positions, rather 
than exempting those who object to facilitating war from military 
service altogether. That is, the fact that drafted pacifists may elect 
to perform community, rather than military, service shows that 
what matters is participation-including mere facilitation-and 
not perpetration. 
Legal and moral thinking go wrong, I have argued, in distin-
guishing between different instances of facilitation on the basis of 
the strength of the causal connection between the objector and 
the asserted wrong. But they do not restrict conscientious exemp-
tions to those who would be made to perpetrate the asserted 
wrong. Nor should they. Participation may be a matter of degree, 
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but the sense of guilt may not-and indeed need not-track the 
extent of one's causal involvement. 
In sum, if we think that the law, at least all else equal, should 
protect people from having to participate in conduct they deem 
wrong, then we have reason to defer to the objector's subjective 
sense of implication even if it is one we do not share. We have, 
that is, presumptive reason to exempt the person who objects to 
funding contraceptive use just so long as she would view funding 
as a significant source of complicity in conduct she deems wrong. 
With that said, the deference I urge is merely presumptive. I turn 
now to the considerations that can and should defeat it, and the 
policies and values that should accompany, inform, and constrain 
a regime of moral or religious accommodation. 
II. CONSCIENTIOUS EXEMPTIONS AND LIBERALISM 
One might grant that there is a case to be made in favor of con-
scientious objection and still contend that a robust exemption 
regime offends against fundamental liberal values. In particular, 
one might argue that such a regime conflicts with three key liberal 
commitments: First, one might worry that granting exemptions is 
unfair because oftentimes the exemptions will impose significant 
costs on individuals who do not share the objectors' religious con-
victions. Second, insofar as the exemptions sought impose burdens 
disproportionately on historically oppressed groups-women, 
in the contraceptive mandate cases, or homosexuals in the cases 
where business owners seek to deny employment or goods and 
services to gays and lesbians-one might worry that exemptions 
involve discrimination, and governmental complicity therein. 
And, finally, one might see in an exemption regime a more wide-
spread failure of governmental neutrality: Had the law evolved in 
more neutral ways, the thought would go, there would be no need 
for customized departures from it in the first place. I address each 
of these worries in turn. 
A. Externalizing the Costs of One's Moral or Religious Convictions 
I have sought to argue that we should, all else equal, grant an 
exemption from a legal requirement if adhering to it would 
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contravene an individual's deeply held moral or religious convic-
tions. But often all else is not equal. In the employer mandate con-
text in particular, granting the employer an exemption might well 
leave his employees without adequate healthcare coverage.42 Thus, 
in the cases where employers object to having to fund contracep-
tion, we would have reason to deny their bids for an exemption 
if the women covered by these employer plans could then obtain 
contraception only at significant cost or inconvenience to them-
selves. Happily, this was not the likely outcome in the Hobby Lobby 
case as the Obama administration had already developed a work-
around, whereby the insurance companies would offer contracep-
tion for free, and so courts could grant exemptions without impos-
ing any costs on the plan beneficiaries. Matters would surely be 
otherwise if the employer objected to life-saving treatment (e.g., 
blood transfusions, whichJehovah's Witnesses oppose), and there 
was no alternative arrangement. 
More generally, claims of conscience ground at most a pre-
sumption in their favor. That presumption will be defeated when 
the cost of an exemption for third parties exceeds some threshold. 
Just where this threshold lies is a matter for us to decide through 
democratic deliberation. We need to determine together the 
extent to which we value freedom of conscience, and the burdens 
we are therefore willing to incur, or impose upon others, in order 
to respect it. Once we have done so, we will have identified a level 
of burden below which exemptions should be granted in the face 
of sincere conscientious objection and beyond which exemptions 
may be denied. In short, one constraint on our exemption regimes 
arises in light of the material consequences an exemption might 
entail for third parties. 
B. Political Oppression and Animus 
Even if we need not worry about third-party costs, though, one 
might still find exemptions objectionable, for they look to provide 
a way for individuals who lost in the democratic sphere to evade 
the outcome they opposed. 43 A plea for an exemption is, in other 
words, the enemy of compromise: The pleading party is unyield-
ing, and granting him the exemption can undermine the pros-
pect of compromise in future efforts at legislation. After all, why 
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should a party dissatisfied with some proposed legal requirement 
settle for a second-best version of his preferred outcome when he 
can instead, as a conscientious objector, seek to evade the result-
ing law altogether? The worry about evasion is especially compel-
ling where one suspects that the objectors aim not just to preserve 
the purity of their souls by ensuring that they do not have a hand 
in, say, facilitating contraceptive use; they aim to right this (sup-
posed) wrong through their objections and (what they hope will 
be) the ensuing denials of access. The concern, in short, is that 
these moral or religious objectors intend sabotage.44 
And there is a more cynical worry still lurking in some of the 
reaction to exemptions to the contraceptive mandate. On this 
thought, what motivates opposition to contraceptive use is not 
genuine concern for nascent human life but instead animus 
against women. It is plausible to see certain efforts to restrict 
access to abortion as evidence of misogyny. 45 And some commen-
tators understand efforts to evade the contraceptive mandate in 
a similar way: As Ilyse Hogue, director of NARAL, says about the 
challenges, "The truth is that this is not about religious freedom, 
it's about sexism, and a fear of women's sexuality."46 
The worry here is not, as it was above, about discrete third par-
ties who bear direct consequences if the government grants an 
exemption. Instead, the concerns suggest that all citizens may have 
reason to feel aggrieved by the intransigence of the objectors. In 
this way, these concerns should prompt us to question the viability 
of a liberal democratic regime in the face of deep and widespread 
division. To address these concerns, I consider in turn two possible 
policy responses: (1) no exemptions; and (2) public provision. 
1. No Exemptions 
Given the threat of sabotage, and the difficulty in discerning the 
objectors' true motivations, we might decide to grant no exemp-
tions at all. Andrew Koppelman proposes as much when he argues 
that we should not permit any exemptions if the legal requirement 
from which the exemption is sought can function only with com-
plete, or at least near-complete, compliance. 47 And this is just the 
way courts have traditionally proceeded, denying religious accom-
modations where the requested exemptions would undermine the 
system or program the legal requirement aims to support. Thus, 
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courts do not permit tax evasion on religious grounds because 
the tax system could not survive a multitude of exemptions.48 So 
too they have denied exemptions from Sunday closing laws on the 
ground that allowing employers to close on any day they choose 
would undermine the effort to grant citizens a common day of 
rest. 49 In this way, Koppelman's concern about subverting the law 
through a grant of too many exemptions makes sense. 
At the same time, the notion that the prospect of being granted 
an accommodation should turn on how many others share one's 
objection has the counterintuitive consequence that widespread 
opposition garners less deference than does opposition that is idio-
syncratic or unusual. Because intersubjective convergence upon a 
proposition is at least some evidence of the proposition's truth, 
one might instead have thought that widespread opposition ought 
to be more compelling than opposition voiced by a few. And, at 
any rate, oppression of a significant minority is surely worse than 
oppression of an insignificant one. 
The problem, writ large, is that compelled employer subsidi-
zation of healthcare that includes elements about which there is 
deep disagreement cannot be squared with the commitment to 
neutrality underpinning liberal democratic politics, and the ten-
sions to which the employer mandate gives rise will be felt on both 
sides of the ideological spectrum. 
From the perspective of the employer with conscientious objec-
tions to some of the forms of healthcare he is mandated to cover, 
the difficulty is just the obverse of the problem of dirty hands: In 
the classic case of dirty hands, politicians compromise themselves 
in order to carry out our political will. As a result, they bear the 
moral stain and suffer the transgression of self on our behalf.50 
Those who believe that contraceptive use ( or other medical care 
that employers are mandated to cover) is wrong might think of 
the employer mandate as just the other side of the coin. Under the 
mandate, the government recruits employers to subsidize contra-
ception and thereby outsources the moral stain to them. 
The government might seek to protect these employers from 
having to incur this stain by allowing them to exclude contracep-
tion from their insurance plans, as the Court did in Hobby Lobby. 
But excusing employers from contraceptive coverage because they 
would otherwise feel implicated in a wrong involves symbolically 
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denigrating women's rights. In other words, having a woman's 
access to contraception turn not on her own convictions but 
instead on those of her employer puts them both in a contest, and 
has the government choose the victor. This is the kind of choice 
that a government committed to neutrality and equality should at 
all costs seek to avoid. 
The exemption/no-exemption options, then, arise after we 
have already made a choice-that provision of basic healthcare 
will fall to private employers, rather than the government. It is 
time to revisit that choice. 
2. Public Provision 
Given the controversy over contraception, one might well won-
der why providing coverage for it should have fallen within the 
employer mandate in the first place. Had the government, from 
the outset, undertaken the obligation to provide contraception to 
all women who needed it, the conflict between employers' con-
science and employees' reproductive freedoms would have been 
avoided. More generally, the government should not recruit its cit-
izens to provide goods or services that a significant portion of the 
populace opposes on conscientious grounds. Instead, providing 
these goods and services should be a core government responsibil-
ity, and it should have been recognized as such during the debates 
over the PPACA. 
It would be naive to overlook the role that special interests played 
in defeating a public option, under which government would have 
competed with private insurance companies for healthcare sub-
scribers.51 We can anticipate that these interests would work even 
more strenuously to impede a regime under which government 
was the only game in town, even if government played the role of 
sole provider for only some, but not all, of the healthcare coverage 
individuals might seek. For good or ill, however, I am concerned 
here only with the principled merits of government contraceptive 
provision, not with its political feasibility. After all, if government 
provision is indefensible on the merits, then we need not worry 
about whether it could be implemented in practice. In any event, 
the issue of government healthcare provision-for contraception 
or other medical care-is largely illustrative. The discussion that 
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follows should illuminate more generally the appropriate role of 
government in issues around which there is deep disagreement. 
One might worry that having government, rather than private 
employers, provide coverage for contraception does not so much 
resolve complicity concerns as displace them. For employers who 
oppose contraception might have just as much reason to object to 
having to fund it through taxation as through insurance subsidi-
zation. In fact, however, I believe that concerns about complicity 
through taxation are more easily met. 
For one thing, the government might be able to provide con-
traception without relying on tax dollars at all. For example, in 
an effort to develop a work-around for religious non-profit insti-
tutions that object to contraception, the Obama administration 
convinced insurance companies to offer contraception at no cost 
either to the religious non-profits or their plan beneficiaries. Insur-
ers were amenable to footing the bill because the costs to them of 
complications arising from unintended pregnancies are far more 
significant than the cost of contraception itself.52 
Moreover, even if the government must draw on the public fisc 
to provide contraception, there are still principled reasons for 
thinking complicity claims less compelling here than in the insur-
ance subsidization context. The relevant line of argument draws 
upon liberal egalitarian responses to libertarian arguments against 
taxation.53 Briefly put: It is reasonable to see a commitment to dis-
tributive justice as immanent in our tax scheme; in particular, our 
tax scheme aims to mitigate or eradicate the effect of brute luck, 
and it does so by claiming, as a matter of right, a portion of the 
earnings of those who are favored, through pure good luck, by 
features of our social and economic arrangements. As such, one's 
tax burden consists, at least in part, of money one has earned in 
fulfillment of one's obligations of justice to compensate those who 
are disadvantaged in our scheme. Since the money used to cover 
this part of one's tax burden is not, and never was, one's own, one 
cannot say that handing it over to the government connects one 
to conduct one deems wrong. Covering the costs of female con-
traception can be seen as part of a redistributive scheme. By some 
lights, structural injustices make it the case that women are all too 
disempowered with respect to deciding whether they will have 
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sex at all.54 At any rate, women currently bear disproportionate 
healthcare costs resulting from unwanted pregnancies, and dispro-
portionate childcare burdens. On this way of understanding the 
objectives of a tax scheme, then, the person who objects to con-
traceptive use has no legitimate complicity claim against taxation 
used to cover others' contraceptive costs. In particular, he cannot 
argue that using tax dollars to cover contraception forces him to 
spend his money on a wrong since the money was never his in the 
first place.55 
Further, even if one rejects the liberal egalitarian rationale for 
taxation, there is still a practical distinction between taxation and 
subsidization: Taxation, we have seen, is not subject to an exemp-
tion on conscientious grounds because the system would collapse 
were such exemptions to be granted. So, even if one concludes 
that the conscientious objector's complaint is strong, it is not one 
to which a court can yield. And the notion that the objector loses 
not on the merits but instead on practical grounds should serve to 
undercut concerns about government partiality.56 
In short, the contraceptive mandate challenges expose the limits 
of both compromise and conscientious objection. The concerns of 
those who object to funding contraception do not admit of com-
promise; reducing the amount these employers contribute will not 
mitigate their concerns. And exempting them altogether might 
implicate the government in an expressive harm, at least where it 
is animus that motivates the objectors. As such, government provi-
sion might well be the most defensible response. Making contra-
ceptive provision a government responsibility in the first instance 
would both allow those who object to contraception to maintain 
clean, or at least cleaner, hands, and would ensure universal access 
to it under an exemption-free regime. While expanding the gov-
ernment's role in women's reproductive choices might not be the 
obvious liberal solution, it is, I believe, the one that most maintains 
fidelity with the foundational core of our political morality. 
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